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Abstract—As independent service providers shift from conven-
tional energy to renewable energy sources, the power distribution
system will likely experience increasingly significant fluctuation in
supply, given the uncertain and intermittent nature of renewable
sources like wind and solar energy. These fluctuations in power
generation, coupled with time-varying consumer demands of
electricity and the massive scale of power distribution networks
present the need to not only design real-time decentralized power
allocation algorithms, but also characterize how effective they are
given fast-changing consumer demands and power generation
capacities. In this paper, we present an Online Decentralized
Dual Descent (OD3) power allocation algorithm and determine
(in the worst case) how much of observed social welfare and
price volatility can be explained by fluctuations in generation
capacity and consumer demand. Convergence properties and
performance guarantees of the OD3 algorithm are analyzed by
characterizing the difference between the online decision and
the optimal decision. The theoretical results in the paper are
validated and illustrated by numerical experiments using real
data.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the quest to integrate more renewable energy sources
into the power distribution grid continues, it is important
to understand how systemic fluctuations both in supply and
consumer demand affect real-time power allocation policies
and the social welfare of the distribution systems. Some
of the challenges of integrating renewable energy sources
into the grid have been well-documented [1, 2]. Though
research on wind forecasting to reduce uncertainty in day
ahead schedules for wind power generation exists, variability
in the wind resource continues to pose challenges for the
integration of wind power in forward electricity markets [3]. A
similar conclusion can be made of solar energy. The market
value of variable renewable energy has also been analyzed;
for instance, in [4], where the authors characterized how
the market value of renewable energy sources varies with
grid integration. Their study found that the value of wind
power fell from 110% of the average power price to about
50− 80% as wind penetration increases from zero to 30% of
total electricity consumption. This study and results on price
fluctuation highlights the difficulty in integrating large-scale
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renewable energy into the distribution grid. Similar studies in
[5, 6] noted the significant impact of variability of renewable
energy sources on the operations of electricity markets. While
long-term plans to efficiently integrate renewable energy into
future energy infrastructure remains on the horizon [7], large-
scale energy storage mechanisms to soften the variations in
supply of energy from renewable sources and the challenges
faced on that front have been proposed [8].
The uncertainties in generation capacity from renewable
energy sources and their effects on the electricity markets
discussed in [4–6], present the need for design of fast, ef-
ficient and scalable decentralized real-time power allocation
algorithms that are robust to inherent systemic fluctuations
resulting from consumers’ constantly changing power needs
and unstable power generation from renewable energy sources.
The current mechanism of a two-way communication in coor-
dinating decentralized power allocation for such large systems
between suppliers and users where the suppliers and users
iteratively communicate and carry out computations until they
reach an agreement to trigger an event is not only expensive
in terms of communication overhead, but also costly in terms
of the time it takes to coordinate. This is not preferred,
especially given the need to track fast system fluctuations such
as variability in generation [9, 10] and consumer demands.
We propose an alternate approach to the aforementioned co-
ordination scheme in which the decentralized power allocation
algorithm is implemented in real-time: At each time-step, the
suppliers update their coordination signal (which is usually
able to be interpreted as price signals), and users determine
optimal allocations based on the price signal and individual
needs.
With this approach, a number of interesting questions arise,
including performance guarantees of the decentralized algo-
rithm in real-time implementation. Since the system (compris-
ing suppliers and users’) respectively have constantly changing
capacities and power needs/utility, the coordination signal
(price) and the power allocation will fluctuate and it is unclear
how optimal the online decisions will be. In this paper,
we focus on investigating and characterizing performance
guarantees of an Online Decentralized Dual Descent (OD3)
power allocation algorithm. In particular, we assume the power
supply and consumers’ utilities fluctuate at the same time scale
as iterations of our algorithm; and derive a bound on social
welfare of users in the system, based on the OD3 algorithm.
To prevent drastic changes in both user utility functions
and supplier capacities between successive time-steps, we
make appropriate smoothness assumptions on the magnitude
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2of fluctuations observed in changes in user utility functions
and available supply. The decentralized, iterative algorithm
presented in this paper avoids the typical two-way message-
passing coordination technique in the literature [11, 12], by
exploiting the underlying physical characteristics of the prob-
lem. Specifically, the suppliers broadcast a price signal, which
the users use in computing their optimal consumption at the
next time step. Rather than wait for a message on consumption
information, the suppliers measure the current power usage to
determine the price for the next cycle. A major challenge is
that during the process, the system environment may change
in that – power capacity and users’ utility changes. In [13], we
investigated a special case of the OD3 algorithm – the static
case, whereas in this paper we consider the more challenging
real-time case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Following
notation and definitions, we introduce the system model as
well as underlying assumptions, summarize the OD3 power
allocation algorithm and state the main result in Section II.
Sections III and IV respectively present a volatility analysis of
the coordinating (price) signal and power allocation variable
and convergence analysis of our algorithm. We follow in
Section V with numerical illustration of our algorithm and
make our conclusions in Section VI.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface
lower and upper case letters, respectively. We denote the
set of real numbers by R, a vector or matrix transpose as
(·)T , and the L2-norm of a vector by ||·||. The gradient of a
function f(·) is denoted ∇f(·), and 〈 ·, ·〉 denotes the inner
product of two vectors. We denote the vector of ones as 1.
Definitions
We say that a function U : RR → R is σ-strongly convex if
for all q1,q2 ∈ RR we have
〈∇U(q1)−∇U(q2),q1 − q2〉 ≥ σ‖q1 − q2‖2, σ > 0.
A function U(q) is strongly concave if −U(q) is strongly
convex, i.e., if for all q1,q2 ∈ RR, we have
−〈∇U(q1)−∇U(q2),q1 − q2〉 ≥ σ‖q1 − q2‖2.
A function U(·) is said to be monotone decreasing, if for all
q1 ≤ q2, it holds that U(q1) ≥ U(q2).
II. MODEL AND ALGORITHM
A. System Model
We consider a power distribution system comprising N
users and R power producers. The objective at time t is to
solve a decentralized dynamic power allocation problem to
maximize the aggregate social welfare of the system. We de-
fine the aggregate social welfare as the utilities users gain from
consuming power qi(t) at time t; that is,
∑N
i=1 U
t
i (qi(t)).
We abstract away specific power flow constraints and assume
that each user and supplier respectively have a dynamic utility
function and capacity. Let the allocation of the N users be
q1(t), · · · ,qN (t), where qi(t) ∈ RR. We assume each user
can choose from the R available power suppliers. The jth
entry of the ith vector, qji (t) represents the power allocation
to the ith user from the jth supplier at time t. Furthermore, let
the capacity of the power suppliers at time t be represented by
the vector Q(t) ∈ RR, where Qj , the jth entry of Q, represents
the power supply capacity at the jth supplier. At time t, the
objective of the system operator is to maximize some strongly
concave utility function of users’ power allocation, U ti (qi(t)).
We formulate the optimal power allocation problem as the
following optimization program for each time t:
maximize
q1(t),...,qN (t)
N∑
i=1
U ti (qi(t))
subject to
N∑
i=1
qi(t) = Q(t).
(1)
The static case of (1) where the utility functions and supplier
capacities are fixed has been studied in the literature; for
example, [13], where the system comprised a single power
producer and N users and conditions that guarantee feasibility
of the power allocation problem at each step of the iterative
solution were derived.
In Problem (1), the decision variable at each user qi is
unrestricted, because we assume that users are able to sell
power to the distribution system. The local utility function
U ti (·) of users and power generation capacity Q(t) on the
supply end are usually time-varying, which poses a challenge
to solving Problem (1), because optimization algorithms are
usually iterative. Another challenge is that the utility functions
U ti (·) are known locally by user i; hence, solving Problem (1)
requires a decentralized algorithm. In the proposed algorithm,
for clarity in presentation, we will use the following matrix
Q = [q1, . . . ,qN ] ∈ RR×N to compute the aggregate power
allocation by each supplier and compute the coordinating (or
price) signal at the next time step.
Assumption 1. (Strong Concavity): We assume the users’
utility functions, U ti (q), are strongly concave in the variable
q with parameter σti .
Assumption 2. (Lipschitz Gradients): The gradients of the
utility function of each user i is Lipschitz continuous at each
time-step. In other words, for all vector pairs q1 and q2,
‖∇U ti (q) − ∇U ti (q2)‖≤ Lti‖q1 − q2‖, where Lti < ∞ is
the Lipschitz constant.
Assumptions 1 and 2 above imply that the (local) objective
function in Problem (1) is strongly concave with Lipschitz
gradients. We will assume that σ and L are respectively
the global concavity and Lipschitz parameter for U ti (·) and
∇U ti (·); that is,
σ = min
i,t
{σti} and L = max
i,t
{Lti}. (2)
Problem (1) can easily be generalized to account for the chang-
ing cost of power production by the suppliers. In this paper,
3we assume the utility functions of users in the system and
capacity of power suppliers are time-changing; and to prevent
drastic variations in the users’ utility functions and suppliers’
capacities, we make the following smoothness assumptions:
Assumption 3. Between successive time-steps the changes in
suppliers’ capacities is bounded by γ; that is,
‖Q(t)−Q(t+ 1)‖≤ γ, ∀ t. (3)
Assumption 4. We assume that each user i has an upper
bound on how much its utility function changes between
consecutive time steps; that is,
‖∇U t+1i (qi)−∇U ti (qi)‖≤ α, ∀ i,qi and t. (4)
Assumption 3 prevents drastic changes in the supply capac-
ities between consecutive time-steps, ensuring a smoothness
property in capacity at the supplier over time. And Assumption
4 ensures that the rate of change in user utility function
over time is bounded – again to avoid drastic changes in
power demand between consecutive time-steps for all users.
These assumptions, in practice, can be enabled by the use of
backup power sources. Our objective is to present a distributed
solution to (1) using a one-way communication (coordination)
protocol that enables us characterize variation in the social
welfare of the system at each time-step as presented in The-
orem 1. We present a decentralized policy to solve (1) using
the following operations for coordinating the decentralized
allocation:
Operation 1 (One-way Communication): At each time-step
t, the power suppliers broadcast a message (referred to as
the unit cost of power), to the users. Note that the cost of
power charged by the R different suppliers are allowed to be
different.
Operation 2 (Feedback Information) At each time-step, the
Load Servicing Entities measure the difference between their
total power capacity and their supply; that is, Q(t)1−Q(t). We
investigate the performance of the well-known dual descent
algorithm for Problem (1). Decentralized algorithms that solve
(1) using Operations 1 and 2 can be achieved via duality
theory. Let p(t) ∈ RR be the dual variable representing the
price charged by the R different suppliers at time t. Then, the
dual problem of (1) is
minimize
p
Dt(p(t)) (5)
where Dt(·) is the dual function and Dt(·) is:
Dt(p(t)) = max
qi
L(q,p), (6)
where
L(q,p) =
[
N∑
i=1
U ti (qi(p(t)))−p(t)T
(
N∑
i=1
qi(p(t))−Q(t)
)]
,
and qi(p(t)) is the power demand of user i based on price
p(t) at time t. The respective local problem for each user i is
to solve:
qi(p(t)) = arg max
qi
[
U ti (qi)− pTqi
]
. (7)
The structure of the problem enables us to claim the following
result:
Lemma 1. (Strong Duality): Consider Problem (1) at time t,
and suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and let p∗(t) be the
optimal solution to (5), then q(p∗(t)) = {qi(p∗(t))}Ni=1 (cf.
(7)) is the optimal solution to (1).
Proof: Convexity of the problem coupled with the con-
straints
∑N
i=1 qi(t) = Q(t), and qi ∈ RR ensures that (1)
satisfies Slater’s condition, yielding a zero duality gap [14,
Chapter 5].
Proposition 1. Consider Problem (1) and suppose Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold, then the dual function (6) is strongly
convex in p with parameter N/L, and its gradient is Lipschitz
continuous with parameter Nσ.
Proof: Details are presented in Appendix A.
We solve Problem (1) in a decentralized manner via a
dual descent algorithm with η > 0 as step size. Based on
aggregate consumption at the previous time-step, suppliers
determine and broadcast the coordinating signal (price). Users
use that information to compute their optimal allocation using
their current utility functions. By exploiting the underlying
physical structure of the network, the supplier measures the
total consumption and computes the next price. We summarize
the Online Dynamic Decentralized Dual Descent (OD3) Algo-
rithm in Algorithm 1. Given Algorithm 1 to solve Problem (1),
Algorithm 1 An Online Decentralized Dual Descent (OD3)
Algorithm for optimal power allocation
Initialization: Suppliers set initial price p(0);
and let η ∈]0, η¯] be given.
1: for t = 0, . . . do
2: Suppliers broadcast p(t)
3: for Users i = 1, . . . , N do
4: User i receives p(t) and solves (7)
5: end for
6: Suppliers measure Q(t)1−Q(t)
and compute next price
7: p(t+ 1) = p(t)− η(Q(t)1−Q(t))
8: end for
of interest is to understand and characterize how the real-time
and optimal system decisions and social welfare of the system
change with time, given the time-varying capacities and utility
functions. This brings us to our main result.
Theorem 1. (Main Result) Suppose Algorithm 1 with step-
size 0 < η ≤ 2L/(N(1 + Lσ)) is used to solve Problem 1,
suppose Assumptions 3, and 4 hold and that each U ti (·) is
Lipschitz with parameter L
′t
i . Suppose L
′ = maxi,t{L′ti }. Let
qi(t) and q∗i (t) respectively be the power allocation obtained
4from Algorithm 1 and the optimal power allocation at time
t. The difference between the aggregate online social welfare
(given fluctuations in the system) and aggregate optimal social
welfare is bounded by∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
U ti (qi(t))−
N∑
i=1
U ti (q
∗
i (t))
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤W, (8)
where
W = NL′
[
ct
σ
||p(0)− p∗(0)||+L
2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)]
,
and c =
(
1− 2ησN
(1 + σL)
)1/2
.
Furthermore, p(0) and p∗(0) are respectively the initial online
and optimal prices, γ and α are respectively the bounds
on variations of the suppliers’ capacity and users’ utility
functions.
Remark 1. Note that for Theorem 1, we assume that the utility
functions themselves (and not their gradients as in Assumption
2) are Lipschitz.
The rest of the paper develops interesting theory that can, in
particular, be used to prove Theorem 1, which is presented in
Section IV-A.
III. VOLATILITY ANALYSIS
In this section we derive bounds on changes in the system
operator’s optimal decisions p∗(t) between successive time-
steps based on Assumptions 3 and 4.
Theorem 2. (Volatility of the Optimal Price): Consider Prob-
lem (1) with dual problem (5). Suppose Assumptions 2 – 4
hold; then
‖p∗(t)− p∗(t+ 1)‖≤ L
2
σ
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
. (9)
Proof: Given that the dual problem (5) is unconstrained,
convex and differentiable, for all t
∇Dt(p?(t)) =
N∑
i=1
[∇U ti ]−1(p∗(t))−Q(t) = 0.
In particular, let Γt(p) =
∑n
i=1[∇U ti ]−1(p); then p∗(t) =
Γ−1t (Q(t)). And by Lemma 3 (see Appendix), the inverse
function of the gradient exists. Using the triangle inequality,
it follows that
‖p∗(t)− p∗(t+ 1)‖=||Γ−1t (Q(t))− Γ−1t+1(Q(t+1))||
≤||Γ−1t (Q(t))−Γ−1t (Q(t+1))||
+ ||Γ−1t (Q(t+1))−Γ−1t+1(Q(t+1))||
≤L
2γ
σN
+
αL2
σ2
=
L2
σ
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
.
The first term in the second inequality above is obtained
from the fact that Γ−1 is L2/(σN)-Lipschitz continuous from
Lemma 3-d (in Appendix D). And the second term comes
from (19) of Lemma 4 ( also in Appendix D).
Theorem 2 above implies that price fluctuation is higher
when the changes in supply capacity γ and user utility
functions α are high. Furthermore, the presence of more
users in the system, captured by N in the first term of
the bound dampens any significant price changes observed
between consecutive time-steps caused by the time-varying
supplier capacities. In addition, the more concave the form of
the utility function of users (for σ > 1), the lower the volatility
in the price (coordinating) signal between consecutive time-
steps.
Given that the power allocation qi(p(t)) at any time t
depends on the price at that time, a consequence of Theorem 2
are bounds on the optimal primal variables, which we present
next.
Corollary 1. Consider problem (1), and given Assumptions
1 and 2, the optimal power allocation between consecutive
iterates, satisfies
‖q∗i (t+ 1)− q∗i (t)‖≤
L2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
+
α
σ
.
Proof: See Appendix B
Similar to the bound in Theorem 2, we find in Corollary
1 that the magnitude of changes in power allocation be-
tween consecutive time steps is proportional to the changes
experienced in supply capacities and users’ utility functions.
Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, when no fluctuations are
recorded in users’ utility functions, the size of the user base
mitigates the changes in power demand between successive
time steps.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM 1
In this section, we analyze convergence of Algorithm 1. In
particular, derive an upper bound on the difference between
the price computed by Algorithm 1 and the optimal price at
each iteration. In [13], we showed how to appropriately select
parameters – such as the step size and initial price, to achieve
a linear convergence rate in the decentralized solution of the
static case of Problem (1).
Lemma 2. For every step-size 0 < η ≤ 2L/(N(1 + Lσ)),
and p ∈ RR, we have
||p∗(t)− (p− η∇Dt(p))||2≤ c2||p∗(t)− p||2 (10)
where c is as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof: Choose any p ∈ RR. Let rt := ‖p∗(t)−p‖. Then
||p∗(t)− (p− η∇Dt(p))||2
= r2t + 2η〈p∗(t)− p,∇Dt(p)〉+ η2||∇Dt(p)||2
≤
(
1−2ηNσ
1+Lσ
)
r2t+η
(
η− 2L
N(1+Lσ)
)
‖∇Dt(p)‖2,
5where we have used [15, Theorem 2.1.12], the fact that D(·)
has Nσ-Lipschitz continuous gradients, is strongly convex
with parameter N/L; the fact that an L-Lipschitz convex
function D(·) satisfies
0 ≤ D(p∗(t))−D(p)−〈∇D(p),p∗(t)−p〉 ≤ L
2
‖p−p∗(t)‖,
and that at the optimal p∗(t), ∇Dt(p∗(t)) = 0. If the step-size
η is chosen such that 0 < η < 2L/N(1 + Lσ), one always
obtains η
(
2L
N(1+σL) − η
)
||∇Dt(p)||2≥ 0; thence,
||p∗(t)−(p−η∇Dt(p))||2≤
(
1− 2ησN
(1 + σL)
)2
||p∗(t)−p||2,
and it follows that, for each iterate p obtained from the OD3
Algorithm 1, the bound in (10) holds.
The choice of the appropriate step-size η results in the
parameter c = 1− 2ησN/((1 +σL)) < 1. Having established
convergence of the OD3 Algorithm 1, we present a result on
real-time tracking the optimal primal and dual variables, given
the dynamic supplier capacities and user utility functions.
Theorem 3. (Tracking the Optimal Dual Variable): Consider
the system Problem (1) and its Dual problem (5). Irrespective
of the initial price p(0), the distance between the optimal price
p∗(t+ 1) and the price iterate of Algorithm 1 at each t is
‖p(t+1)−p∗(t+1)‖≤ b
1− c+c
t
(
‖p(0)− p∗(0)‖− b
1− c
)
,
(11)
where from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2 respectively,
b = L2
( γ
σN
+
α
σ2
)
and c =
(
1− 2ησN
(1 + σL)
) 1
2
. (12)
The bound in Eq. (11) above has two components – a
transient term (similar to the dual gradient algorithm), which
converges to 0 as t goes to ∞. Furthermore, the second
component of the bound is due to system fluctuations and
never becomes 0 over time.
Proof: Using the triangle inequality, we can express the
LHS of (11) as
‖p(t+1)−p∗(t+1)‖≤ ‖p(t+1)−p∗(t)‖+‖p∗(t)−p∗(t+1)‖.
Observe that bounds for the first and second summands of
the RHS above have been respectively derived in Lemma 2
and Theorem 2. Since ‖p∗(t)−p∗(t+1)‖≤ b (from Theorem
2), one obtains ‖p(t+1)−p∗(t+1)‖≤ ‖p(t+1)−p∗(t)‖+b,
which further simplifies into ‖p(t+1)−p∗(t+1)‖≤ c‖p(t)−
p∗(t)‖+b. Further simplification results in
‖p(t+1)−p∗(t+1)‖ ≤ ct‖p(0)− p∗(0)‖+
t∑
i=0
cib
= ct||p(0)− p∗(0)||+1− c
t
1− c b
=
b
1− c + c
t
(
‖p(0)− p∗(0)‖− b
1− c
)
,
(13)
which concludes the proof.
In Equation (13) above, the first equality uses the sum of
a geometric series, and the last equality separates the bound
into a constant and transient term. A similar result is obtained
for the primal variable.
Theorem 4. (Tracking the Optimal Primal Variable): Con-
sider the system problem (1) and its dual problem (5). Re-
gardless of the initial unit of power demanded per user qi(0),
the distance between the optimal unit of power q∗i (t+ 1) and
the units generated by Algorithm 1 at each t is
‖qi(t+ 1)−q∗i (t+ 1)‖≤
ct
σ
‖p(0)−p∗(0)‖+L
2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
,
where the constant c comes from Theorem 3.
Proof: See Appendix C
Remark 2. As in Theorem 3, the bound on changes in power
allocations depends on two terms – a transient term that
converges to 0 as t → ∞, and a term that depends on
fluctuations in user utility functions and supplier capacity in
the distribution system. With the results established thus far,
we are ready to prove the main result of this paper earlier
stated in Section II.
A. Proof of Main Result (Theorem 1)
Proof: Let each U ti (q) be L
′-Lipschitz continuous. Thus
for any q1(t),q2(t) ∈ RR, we have
||U ti (q1(t))− U ti (q2(t))||≤ L′||q1(t)− q2(t)||.
Summing both sides and using the triangle inequality,∣∣∣∣∣∣∑U ti (q1(t))−∑U ti (q2(t))∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑∣∣∣∣U ti (q1(t))− U ti (q2(t))||≤ NL′||q1(t)− q2(t)∣∣∣∣ .
Suppose q(t) = q1(t) and q∗(t) = q2(t); from Theorem 4
we can derive a bound on the Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of the
above expression; that is,∣∣∣∣∣∣∑U ti (q(t))−∑U ti (q∗(t))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ NL′||q(t)− q∗(t)||
≤ NL′
[
ct
σ
||p(0)− p∗(0)||+L
2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)]
,
where
c =
(
1− 2ησN
1 + σL
)1/2
.
Since c < 1 (from Lemma 2), the first term of the bound
above goes to zero as t goes to infinity, and the second term
is a constant term. Hence, the deviation of the aggregate online
social welfare (computed using the OD3 algorithm), from the
aggregate optimal social welfare is bounded.
Next, we analyze how well the iterates of Algorithm 1
satisfy the feasibility conditions of Problem (1); that is,
N∑
i=1
qi(t)−Q(t) = 0
6The next result characterizes feasibility (constraint violation)
of the OD3 Algorithm for Problem (1).
Corollary 2. Given Algorithm 1 to solve Problem (1). Let the
primal iterates of Algorithm 1 be qi(t) at each time t, the
constraint of Problem (1) satisfies the following bound∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
qi(t)−Q(t)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Nσ b1− c+ct
(
‖p(0)−p∗(0)‖− b
1− c
)
.
Proof: To prove this, note that Problem (1) is a convex
program. Further, since its utility functions are strongly con-
cave, the equality constraint is binding, for the set of optimal
decision variables {q∗i (t)}Ni=1; that is,
∑N
i=1 q
∗
i (t) − Q = 0.
Hence, since qi(t) = (∇U ti )−1(p(t)) and from Lemma 4, it
follows that∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
qi(t)−Q(t)
∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
qi(t)−
N∑
i=1
q∗i (t)
∥∥∥∥∥ (14)
= ‖Γt(p(t))− Γt(p∗(t))‖
≤ N
σ
‖p(t)− p∗(t)‖, (15)
since Γt(·) is N/σ-Lipschitz continous from Lemma 3-c and
the statement of the result follows from Theorem 3.
Therefore, at each iteration of the algorithm, the constraint
violations are bounded by (15). The bound is intuitive since
the power allocation depends on the price at that time instance
and more users in the system results in increased violation of
the allocation-capacity equality constraint.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
We illustrate the performance of the OD3 power allocation
algorithm on Problem (1) comprising N = 10 users and one
supplier. For each user i = 1, . . . , 10, we set U ti (qi(t)) =
−(qi(t)−sti)2. The variation in the utility functions is captured
by the time-varying term sti; and this choice of utility function
U ti (·) is strongly concave. The real data on power supply
was obtained from [16]. The power generation data was
from biofuel, wind and solar sources and capture real-world
fluctuations experienced in the power distribution system. In
implementing Algorithm 1, the step size used is the optimal
step size η = 1/N . In Figure 1, we illustrate the performance
of the OD3 algorithm on the social welfare of the system
in relation to the optimal social welfare over time, given
fluctuating system dynamics. As can be observed in the plot,
the social welfare computed online tracks the optimal social
welfare. The plot in Figure 2 shows the aggregate online
power allocation computed by the OD3 algorithm relative to
the optimal aggregate power allocation and the power supply
capacity. Notice that due to the equality constraint in (1), the
optimal aggregate power is, in fact, the supplier capacity at
each iteration. Furthermore, the online aggregate power closely
follows the aggregate optimal allocation.
Figure 3, illustrates the price p(t) generated by the OD3
algorithm and the optimal price p∗(t) at each iteration for
the multi-user, single supplier example. The results shown
here indicate that the real-time, prices, computed online are
very close to their respective optimal values at each time-step,
despite the system fluctuations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of allocating
electric power to users in a power distribution system, where
the utility functions of the users and supply capacities of
the suppliers are time-varying using an OD3 algorithm. We
assumed the changes in the supplier capacities and user utility
functions are changing at the the same time-scale as itera-
tions in the algorithm, and presented a worst-case robustness
analysis of the OD3 algorithm. In particular, we investigated
and characterized performance guarantees of the OD3 power
allocation Algorithm by deriving bounds on the social welfare
of the system as a function of fluctuations in the system
resulting from dynamic supply capacities as well as changes in
the users’ utility functions. The OD3 algorithm uses a one-way
message passing protocol between the users and the suppliers
in which the suppliers broadcast a coordinating signal (price)
and the users locally compute their power allocation based
on the price received. Furthermore, we presented and showed
convergence of the OD3 algorithm. As illustrated, fluctuations
in optimal allocation and price depend on variations in supply
capacity and user utility functions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let L be the global Lipschitz continuity parameter
for all users i and time t. Consider the decomposed dual
function between users D(p) =
∑N
i=1Di(p), where
Dti(p) = U
t
i (qi(p(t)))− pTqi(p(t)) +
1
N
p(t)TQ(t),
with gradient
∇Di(p(t)) = Q(t)/N − qi(p(t))
= Q(t)/N − (∇U ti )−1(p(t)) (16)
where qi(p) is defined in (7). To prove the Proposition, we
show that Di(p) is 1/L−convex. From [15, Theorem 2.1.9]
Di(p) is 1/L−convex if and only if for all p1, p2,
1
L
‖p2 − p1‖2≤ 〈p2 − p1,∇Di(p2)−∇Di(p1)〉
=
〈
p2 − p1,
(−(∇Ui)−1(p2))− (−(∇Ui)−1(p1))〉 ,
(17)
where the equality comes from taking the gradient of the
dual function and using the optimal solutions (7). The inverse
(∇U)−1 exists since U is strongly concave. Hence, ∇Ui is
bijective and we can choose vectors q1,q2 ∈ RR such that
∇Ui(q1) = p1 and ∇Ui(q2) = p2. Since Ui is L−smooth
(from Assumption 1), we have that [15]:
−〈∇Ui(q2)−∇Ui(q1),q2−q1〉≥ 1
L
‖∇Ui(q2)−∇Ui(q1)‖2,
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Fig. 1. A plot showing the social welfare of the
system computed by the OD3 algorithm in real-time
and the optimal social welfare over time.
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Fig. 2. This figure shows the the total power
allocated to users in real-time in comparison to
the optimal total power and the total power supply
available over time.
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Fig. 3. This figure illustrates the prices at each
time-step generated by the real-time OD3 algo-
rithm and the optimal price.
or by using ∇U(q1) = p1 and ∇U(q2) = p2, we get〈
p2−p1,
(−(∇Ui)−1(p2))− (−(∇Ui)−1(p1))〉≥ 1
L
‖p2−p1‖2.
Hence, (17) holds and we can conclude that Di(p) is 1/L-
convex; therefore,
∑N
i=1Di(·) is N/L strongly convex.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Using the fact that q∗i (t) = (∇U ti )−1(p∗(t)),
∇U ti (·) is Lti-Lipschitz continuous, and the bound in Theorem
2, via the triangle inequality one obtains
‖q∗i (t+1)−q∗i (t)‖=‖[∇U t+1i ]−1(p∗(t+1))− [∇U ti ]−1(p∗(t))‖
≤‖[∇U t+1i ]−1(p∗(t+1))−[∇U ti ]−1(p∗(t+1))‖
+‖[∇U ti ]−1(p∗(t+1))−[∇U ti ]−1(p∗(t))‖
≤ 1
σ
||p∗(t)− p∗(t+1)||+α
σ
≤L
2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
+
α
σ
where we have used that [∇U ti ]−1 is 1/σ-Lipschitz con-
tinuous, see Lemma 3-b), and Eq. (19) in Lemma (4) (in
Appendix) together with Theorem (2).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: For simplicity in notation, let Q = ‖qi(t + 1) −
q∗i (t+1)‖. Via the triangle inequality, we can express the LHS
of (11) as
Q=‖(∇U t+1i )−1(p(t+1))− (∇U t+1i )−1(p∗(t+1))‖
≤ ‖(∇U t+1i )−1(p(t+1))− (∇U t+1i )−1(p∗(t))‖
+ ‖(∇U t+1i )−1(p∗(t))− (∇U t+1i )−1(p∗(t+1))‖
≤ 1
σ
‖p(t+ 1)− p∗(t)‖+ 1
σ
‖p∗(t)− p∗(t+ 1)‖
≤ 1
σ
c‖p(t)− p∗(t)‖+ 1
σ
L2
σ
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
≤ c
t
σ
‖p(0)− p∗(0)‖+L
2
σ2
( γ
N
+
α
σ
)
,
where the last inequality above comes from Lemma 2.
APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL LEMMAS AND ASSOCIATED PROOFS
Lemma 3. Suppose that Ui is σ-concave has L-Lipschitz
gradient, for all i = 1, · · · , N . Then the following holds:
a) ∇Ui is bijective on RR for all i=1, · · ·, N , i.e., ∇U−1i
exists.
b) ∇U−1i is 1/σ-Lipschitz continuous and monotone decreas-
ing with parameter σ/L2, i.e., for all x1,x2 ∈ RR
−〈∇U−1i (x1)−∇U−1i (x2),x1−x2〉 ≥ (σ/L2)||x1−x2||2.
c) Γ :=
∑N
i=1[∇Ui]−1 is bijective, N/σ-Lipschitz continuous
and Nσ/L2 monotone decreasing.
d) Γ−1 is L2/(Nσ)-Lipschitz continuous.
Proof: We omit the proofs and refer readers to classic
texts in analysis such as [17].
Lemma 4. Suppose U ti are σ-strongly concave and the gradi-
ents are L-Lipschitz continuous for all i and t and Assumption
4 holds. Then for all p, Q ∈ RN the following inequalities
hold: ∥∥∥[∇U ti ]−1(p)− [∇U t+1i ]−1(p)∥∥∥ ≤ ασ , (18)∥∥∥Γ−1t (Q)− Γ−1t+1(Q)∥∥∥ ≤ αL2σ2 , (19)
8where Γ(p) =
∑N
i=1[∇U ti ]−1(p).
Proof:
We start by showing that for p ∈ RN it holds that∥∥∥[∇U ti ]−1(p)− [∇U t+1i ]−1(p)∥∥∥ ≤ ασ . (20)
By Lemma 3-a) there exist x1,x2 ∈ RN such that ∇U ti (x1) =
∇U t+1i (x2) = p. Hence using the triangle inequality we get
that
0 = ‖p− p‖
= ‖∇U t+1i (x2)−∇U ti (x1)‖
≥ ‖∇U t+1i (x2)−∇U t+1i (x1)||−‖∇U t+1i (x1)−∇U ti (x1)‖
≥ σ‖x2 − x1‖−α. (21)
By rearranging (21) we get that
α
σ
≥||x2 − x1||=
∥∥∥[∇U ti ]−1(p)− [∇U t+1i ]−1(p)∥∥∥. (22)
By summing over (20) and using triangle inequality we
get also that
‖Γt(p)− Γt+1(p)‖≤ αN
σ
. (23)
Now take any Q ∈ RR. Using that Γt and Γt+1 are bijective,
(from Lemma 3-c)), there exists p1,p2 ∈ RN such that Q =
Γt(p1) = Γt+1(p2). Similarly, we obtain
0 = ‖Q−Q‖
= ‖Γt+1(p2)− Γt(p1)‖
≥ ‖Γt+1(p2)− Γt+1(p1)‖−‖Γt+1(p1)− Γt(p1)‖
≥ Nσ
L2
‖p2 − p1‖−αN
σ
. (24)
Finally, by rearranging (24) and using that Γt and Γt+1 are
bijective, (from Lemma 3-c)), we get that
αL2
σ2
≥ ‖p2 − p1‖= ‖Γ−1t (Q)− Γ−1t+1(Q)‖. (25)
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